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Available online 10 May 2016Recent ﬁndings indicate that the binding and synchronization of distributed neural activities are crucial for cog-
nitive processes and consciousness. In addition, there is increasing evidence that disrupted feature binding is re-
lated to experiences of disintegration of consciousness in schizophrenia. These data suggest that the disrupted
binding and disintegration of consciousness could be typically related to schizophrenia in terms of Bleuler's con-
cept of “splitting”. In this context, deﬁcits inmetacognitive capacity in schizophrenia may be conceptualized as a
spectrum from more discrete to more synthetic activities, related to speciﬁc levels of neural binding and
neurocognitive deﬁcits. This review summarizes the recent research onmetacognition and its relationship to def-
icits of conscious awareness that may be found in schizophrenia patients. Deﬁcits in synthetic metacognition are
likely linked to the integration of information during speciﬁc processes of neural binding. Those in turn may be
related to a range of mental activities including reasoning style, learning potential and insight.
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In 1881, Eugen Bleuler begandeveloping his view that the core prob-
lem among individuals with psychosis is determined by disruptions of
thought-linkages and deﬁcits in the coordination of different psycholog-
ical functions. These anomalies were thought to lead to a “loosening of
associations” related to the process of splitting. Bleuler deﬁned the
term splitting as a process of formation of complex mental structures
linked to incompatible experiences producing numerous divisions in
mental processes (Bleuler, 1918/1906). In his work: “Dementia praecox
or the group of the schizophrenias”, Bleuler (1911), introduced the term
“schizophrenia” to describe the illness that replaced Kraepelin's demen-
tia praecox (Bleuler, 1911/1955, 1918/1906; Jung, 1909). Bleuler
thought that: “…the ‘splitting’ of the different psychic functions is one
of its most important characteristics” (Bleuler, 1911/1955, p.8). Accord-
ing to Bleuler (1911/1955) some psychic complexes creating aggregates
of thoughts, feelings and affects may dominate personality structure,
while other complexes may be “split off” and operate as fragments con-
nected with the others in an “illogical”way.
In historical context Bleuler's deﬁnition of “split mind” as a character-
istic feature of disturbed cognition in schizophrenia is related toharles University, 1st Faculty of
. This is an open access article underDescartes' proposal the binding multidimensional information from vari-
ous sensory modalities that enables conscious experience (Bob, 2015;
Barrera-Mera and Barrera-Calva, 1998). The so-called “binding problem”
leads to the unresolved question where and how the information is inte-
grated into the whole and how this information is speciﬁcally linked to
previous experience in the spatio-temporal memory. An important ques-
tion for further research of the integration of distributed brain activities is
whether the essential integrative role can be attributed to a speciﬁc struc-
ture in the brain or whether this ability is inherent to the cognitive net-
work as a whole. In addition it is not known how spatial convergency is
provided for the synthesis of processed information that emerges and
for example, there are only a few neural connections between speciﬁc vi-
sual areas that correlate with color and motion (Bartels and Zeki, 2006;
LaRock, 2006; Zeki, 1994, 2003). For example, visual consciousness re-
quires activity in many areas of the brain and the components of the
high-level visual representations, closely linked to focused attention,
need to access these structures, form a perceptual object and bind togeth-
er various features of an object (Zeki and Bartels, 1999; Cavanagh, 2011).
A key evidence for the binding problem reported studies of primate
extrastriate visual cortex which have shown that different neurons
within the visual system participate on processing of different features
of a seen object (Desimone et al., 1985; Schein and Desimone, 1990;
Ghose and Tso, 1997). For example, Desimone et al. (1985) have
found that neurons in visual area (V4) and inferior temporal cortex
(IT) are sensitive to many kinds of information relevant to objectthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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visual processing may lie in speciﬁc spatial and spectral interactions
and that many different stimulus qualities are processed in parallel
mode of processing. Similar results reported Ghose and Tso (1997),
who also found that V4 contains modular assemblies of cells related to
particular aspects of processed object-based representations. There is
also evidence in research of moving objects that other neurons in the
middle temporal area and the medial superior temporal area encode
various aspects related to the motion of the stimulus (Treue and
Andersen, 1996; O'Keefe and Movshon, 1998).
Signiﬁcant contribution to this discussion about mechanisms of
large scale integration reported Crick and Koch (1992, 2003) in their
studies of the visual consciousness. They proposed that the problem of
binding may not be resolved only as a simple consequence of synchro-
nization among large groups of neurons. As a basis for that opinion
they emphasize the binding problem of distributed information
representing a seen object by groups of synchronized excited neurons
that are located at different parts of the brain. This problemhas emerged
in connection to ﬁndings that features of an object such as color, shape,
texture, size, brightness, etc. produce activity in separate areas of the vi-
sual cortex (Crick and Koch, 1992; Felleman and Van Essen, 1991;
Singer, 1993, 2001). In context of these ﬁndings the hypothetical center
for brain information convergency that enables perceptual conscious-
ness and conscious experience was termed “Cartesian theatre” (Crick
and Koch, 1992; Dennett, 1991). Recent neuroscience, however, has
not located a distinct place in which distributed information in the
brain comes together. Additionally, there is evidence that neocortical
processing is distributed during all sensory and motor functions
(Singer, 1993, 2001).
The predominant view in neuroscience of consciousness is that neu-
ronal synchronization is a phenomenon that is necessary for the large
scale integration of distributed neuronal activities. There is increasing
experimental evidence that coherent neuronal assemblies in the brain
are functionally linked by phase synchronization among simultaneously
recorded EEG signals and that this time-dependent synchrony between
various discrete neuronal assemblies represents neural substrate for
mental representations such as perception, cognitive functions and
memory (Varela et al., 2001; Lachaux et al., 1999). These functions are
related to distributed macroscopic patterns of neuronal activity which
involve multiple neuronal subsystems bound into a coherent whole
(Braitenberg, 1978; Van Putten and Stam, 2001). According to recent
data, a mechanism that enables binding of distributedmacroscopic pat-
terns of neuronal activity, represented by neural assemblies, into the co-
herent whole is still unresolved and represents a fundamental problem
in neuroscience [i.e., the binding problem: how the brain codes and in-
tegrates distributed neural activities during processes connected to per-
ception, cognition and memory] (Woolf and Hameroff, 2001; Lee et al.,
2003a; Arp, 2005; Fidelman, 2005; Velik, 2010). The theory of feature
binding originates with distributed coding and states that neurons in-
volved in the processing of a single object will tend to synchronize
their ﬁring, while simultaneously desynchronizing their ﬁring from
the remaining neurons not involved in the processing of the object
(von der Malsburg and Schneider, 1986). An essential feature of neuro-
nal assembly coding is that individual neurons or subsystems can par-
ticipate at different times in an almost unlimited number of different
assemblies (Sannita, 2000; Varela et al., 2001). The same neurons can
participate in different perceptual events and different combinations
of these neurons can represent different perceptual objects. Synchroni-
zation of these different perceptual objects is related to the integration
of perceptions into a coherent whole (Singer and Gray, 1995). As a can-
didatemechanism for the integration or binding of distributed brain ac-
tivities is the so-called gamma activity—high frequency oscillations
according to some studies varying from 20 to 100 Hz. This activity oc-
curs synchronously across brain regions and underlies the integration
of diverse brain activities (Singer and Gray, 1995; Wang and Buzsaki,
1996; Buzsaki, 2006; Bob and Mashour, 2011).In this context, majority of recent studies on neural correlate of con-
sciousness have focused on EEG analysis and observed functionally rel-
evant periods of synchronization mainly in gamma frequency band in
various species and brain structures during attention, perception,
motor and memory tasks (Singer, 2001; Lee et al., 2003a; Jensen et al.,
2007). Together these ﬁndings suggest that a candidate mechanism
for the integration or binding of distributed brain activities is the
gamma activity which enables to different neuronal circuits to enter
into synchrony with the perceptual information. This integrative pro-
cess enables to these simultaneously active neuronal clusters oscillate
together during transient periods of synchronized ﬁring and this coher-
ent whole enables to connect various memories and associations in-
volved in the process and generate a coherent process of perception,
cognitive processing, memory and consciousness (Buzsaki, 2006). Sev-
eral recent ﬁndings suggest that the higher and the lower frequencies
may play a speciﬁc role in binding and connectivity with speciﬁc mani-
festation in cognition and its disturbances. These results agree with the
ﬁndings that disconnection and disturbed binding as a correlate ofmen-
tal disintegration in schizophrenia may be related to decreased or in-
creased synchrony (Lee et al., 2003a; Tononi and Edelman, 2000;
Uhlhaas and Singer, 2006). Decreased or increased synchrony associat-
ed with schizophrenia symptoms likely reﬂects process of functional
segregation of sets of neurons that occurs in different cortical areas
and causes segregation or increased information ﬂow across specialized
brain areas of the brain (Sporns et al., 2000, 2002).
Through this mechanism gamma activity occurs synchronously
across brain regions and underlies the integration of diverse brain activ-
ities (Singer and Gray, 1995). Crucial result of these studies is a direct
link between visual perception and gamma synchrony in the cat visual
cortex reported by Eckhorn et al. (1988). Following this ﬁnding, func-
tional signiﬁcance of synchronous gamma activity in selective attention,
perceptual processing and recognition was repeatedly demonstrated in
animal and human studies (Meador et al., 2005; Rodriguez et al., 2004;
Jensen et al., 2007). Together these data strongly suggest that complex
cognitive functions are organized at a global level that enables to inte-
grate primitive functions organized in localized brain regions (Bressler
and Kelso, 2001; Bob, 2011). In this context, current predominant hy-
pothesis relies on the assumption of the global mode of functioning
that is based on large-scale information processing that requires mech-
anisms of functional integration of multiple disparate neural assemblies
(Varela et al., 2001; Fries et al., 2001; Jensen et al., 2007).
Although themajority of research on feature binding has focused on
synchronous gamma activity, there is evidence that synchronous activ-
ities in other frequency bandsmay also participate in functional integra-
tion of distributed neural activities into the coherent whole (Bressler et
al., 1993; Lee et al., 2003a). Following these ﬁndings Dennett (1991)
proposed “a multiple drafts” theory of consciousness model that does
not deﬁne consciousness as a unitary process but rather a distributed
one. Instead of a single central place i.e. “Cartesian theatre,” there are
various events of content-ﬁxation that occur in various places at various
times in the brain (Dennett, 1991, p. 365).
On the other hand there are possible limitations and controversial
points whether neural synchrony mediates visual feature grouping or
just represents its neural correlate that in principle does not explain
the process of feature binding or “binding problem” (Palanca and
DeAngelis, 2005; Bob, 2011; Ray and Maunsell, 2015; Bosman et al.,
2014; Merker, 2013). Nevertheless the evidence for this view linking
consciousness and gammaactivitywas reported by awhole series of ex-
perimental results in cognitive neuroscience and psychology (LaRock,
2006; Varela and Thompson, 2003; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999; van
der Velde and de Kamps, 2006; Zeki, 2003).
Recent ﬁndings indicate that these characteristic mental deﬁcits re-
lated to conscious integration in schizophrenia are typically linked to
abnormalities in brain development and neurocognitive deﬁcits in in-
formation processing, verbal memory and executive functioning (Braff
et al., 2007; Green et al., 2013; Hori et al., 2012; Light and Braff, 2005;
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tive deﬁcits typical for schizophrenia may be related to speciﬁc deﬁcits
of information integration in the process of neural binding. Such deﬁcits
in neural bindingmay be linked to the disintegration of conscious expe-
rience and mental life as well as metacognitive disturbances in
schizophrenia.
2. Disturbed neural synchrony and schizophrenia
In this context, accumulating evidence from electrophysiological,
physiological and anatomical studies indicates that abnormalities in
the synchronized electromagnetic ﬁeld reﬂecting activities of neuronal
assemblies may play a central role in the pathophysiology of schizo-
phrenia (Bob, 2012; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010; Uhlhaas et al., 2008;
Woo et al., 2010). These studies show that schizophrenia involves ab-
normalities in brain oscillatory activity as measured by EEG synchrony.
Speciﬁcally, there are abnormalities in gamma band activity of EEG elec-
tromagnetic spectrum and likely these abnormalities are related to cog-
nitive deﬁcits and other symptoms of schizophrenia (Bob et al., 2008,
2010; Lee et al., 2003a, 2010; Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010; Uhlhaas et al.,
2006; Woo et al., 2010). For example, Uhlhaas et al. (2006) have
found that increased phase synchrony correlates with the positive
symptoms of delusions and hallucinations. Similarly, Lee et al. (2003b)
in an auditory oddball paradigmexperiment reported changes in frontal
and left hemisphere gamma synchrony. They found that positive symp-
toms related to Reality Distortion are associated with increased right
synchrony, Psychomotor Poverty is related to decreased left hemi-
sphere synchrony and disorganization symptoms show a widespread
enhancement with a delay in frontal Gamma synchrony (Lee et al.,
2010). Other study examining relationship between disturbed long-
range synchrony of gamma oscillations and clinical symptoms has
been reported by Mulert et al. (2011), who found positive correlation
between auditory hallucinations symptom scores and phase synchroni-
zation between the primary auditory cortices. Also another study
documenting positive correlations between the phase synchronization
of beta and gamma oscillations and hallucination symptoms in schizo-
phrenia patients has been reported by (Spencer et al., 2004). These def-
icits in neural oscillations likely may represent the functional correlate
of dysconnectivity in cortical networks underlying the associative split-
ting and characteristic fragmentations of mind and behavior.
In context of understanding schizophrenia as associative splitting
and disturbed contextual awareness, Uhlhaas et al. (2006) found that
deﬁcits in Gestalt perception in schizophrenia patients are associated
with reduced phase synchrony in the beta-band (20–30 Hz) but not in
the gamma-band (40–70 Hz) suggesting that the coordination deﬁcit
of neural activities are related to speciﬁc cognitive dysfunctions associ-
ated with Gestalt and contextual associations.
Linking disturbances of integrative mental functions has been also
reported in studies focused on deﬁcits in self-monitoring. For example,
Ford et al. (2008), who reported relationship between gamma synchro-
ny and corollary discharges in schizophrenic patients. They found that
gamma band neural synchrony that preceded pressing of the button
was decreased in the patients, which is consistent with ﬁndings that
deﬁcits in self-monitoring andwilled actions could result from a dys-
function of the corollary discharge system reﬂecting communication
between the frontal and temporal lobes related to the breakdown of
self-monitoring, self-agency self-awareness and insight (Feinberg,
1978; Fishman, 2008; Ford et al., 2001, 2007; Ford and Mathalon,
2005; Frith, 1987; Taylor, 2011; Friston and Frith, 1995). These deﬁ-
cits in schizophrenia are typically related to impaired information
processing that may increase the modularity of brain functions
(Ford et al., 2008) which may cause that for example, inner speech
is misidentiﬁed as external voices (Ford et al., 2001, 2007; Poulet
and Hedwig, 2007).
These disturbed interactions between brain structures produce pat-
terns of temporal disorganizationwith decreased functional connectivitythat may underlie speciﬁc perceptual and cognitive states and cause dis-
integration of information across specialized brain areas of the brain in
schizophrenic patients (Crossley et al., 2009; Kuhn and Gallinat, 2013;
Parnaudeau et al., 2013; Sporns et al., 2000, 2002; Uhlhaas and Singer,
2010). This disintegration of consciousness probably produces defective
self-monitoring and self-experiencing (Feinberg, 1978; Ford and
Mathalon, 2005; Ford et al., 2001) and this lack of information integra-
tion likely reﬂects theprocess of functional segregation of sets of neurons
localized in different cortical areas and may represent an underlying
mechanism of process of dissociation, disturbance of conscious experi-
ence and self leading to lack of contextual awareness, self-monitoring
and insight (Bob and Mashour, 2011).
In this context, interesting data related to contextual awareness
have been reported by Farina et al. (2014), who studied relationships
between memories of attachment and EEG connectivity using coher-
ence analysis. They found that after administration of the adult attach-
ment interview in patients with dissociation these patients did not
show increased EEG connectivity displayed by healthy controls. These
data suggest speciﬁc disintegrative effect of retrieval of traumatic at-
tachmentmemories and disturbed contextual awareness in dissociative
patients. This result is in agreement with data reported by Lee et al.
(2014), indicating that functional connectivity in resting state in pa-
tients with PTSD is decreased compared to controls and these levels of
functional connectivity in the patients were signiﬁcantly correlated
with PTSD symptom severity. These data also suggest that decreased
connectivity reﬂects contextual disturbances related to traumatic and
stressful memories.
On the other hand, similar ﬁndings on EEG connectivity associated
with contextual awarenesswere studied byBowden et al. (2005) during
an experience of insight. They found a sudden burst of high-frequency
gamma-band in scalp EEG reﬂecting neural activity immediately before
insight solutions. They concluded that solvers abruptly change the focus
of their solving efforts just before insight, allowing information linking
various problem elements to manifest into consciousness (Bowden et
al., 2005). Characteristic changes in gamma oscillations during in-
creased levels of awareness during the experience of insight reported
also Sheth et al. (2009), who recorded multivariate electroencephalo-
gram signals in healthy participants while they solved verbal puzzles.
They found gamma band increased in right fronto-central and frontal
electrode regionswhen the solutionwas correct, andwhen participants
used successful (vs. unsuccessful) utilization of the external hint. They
proposed that increased awareness and insight typically reﬂect trans-
formative thoughts characterized by efﬁcient recovery of information
from memory and focused attention to a problem (Sheth et al., 2009).
Some data also indicate, that for example artists as compared to non-
artists also show signiﬁcantly higher phase synchrony in EEG in the
high frequency beta and gamma bands due to their ability of binding
various details of the complex artworks to create internal representa-
tions (Bhattacharya and Petsche, 2002). Also other studies indicate
that increased gamma oscillations are closely associated with contextu-
al awareness, insight, emergence of new perspectives and creative solu-
tions (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Sandkuhler
and Bhattacharya, 2008) and conscious awareness related to attentional
focus in general (Baars, 2002; Tononi, 2004; Tononi and Edelman, 1998;
Uhlhaas and Singer, 2010).
Taken together accumulating evidence from experimental and clin-
ical studies shows that the process of dynamic binding and information
integration that enable consciousness and awareness are related to
transient and precise synchronization of neuronal activities which is
signiﬁcantly disturbed in schizophrenia (Lee et al., 2003a; Tononi and
Edelman, 2000). These disturbed interactions produce patterns of tem-
poral disorganization in neural synchronization which is related to de-
creased functional connectivity underlying speciﬁc perceptual and
cognitive states, and cause disintegration of information across special-
ized brain areas in schizophrenic patients (Sporns et al., 2000, 2002; Bob
and Mashour, 2011).
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tional correlate of dysconnectivity and binding deﬁcits in cortical net-
works. These ﬁndings provide novel concepts which connect
neuroscience descriptions with processes of conscious disintegration
and phenomenological levels describing typical subjective experiences
related to schizophrenia including perceptual anomalies, delusions
and subjective experiences related to intentionality and meaning of
life that as speciﬁc subjective qualities of individual experience cannot
be reduced on description of brain processes (Hoffman et al., 2008;
Mishara and Fusar-Poli, 2013; Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007).
In this context, recent ﬁndings show crucially new concept how we
can understand schizophrenia without reductionist viewpoints usually
represented by a postulate that psychological processes including self-
reference and conscious experience per se represent just epiphenomena
of neurophysiological processes (Bob, 2015; Vahey andWhelan, 2015).
These current ﬁndings have intriguing and important implications
for therapy that in the future may be focused on meaningful connec-
tions and relationships between mind and brain that via psychothera-
peutic inﬂuences may enable to integrate brain functions.3. Stress, trauma and mental disintegration
According to recent ﬁndings typical neurocognitive deﬁcits in
schizophrenia, mainly secondary verbal memory, immediate memory,
executive functioning and vigilance are closely linked to dysfunctional
behavior and impaired psychosocial functioning (Lin et al., 2011;
Lipkovich et al., 2009). For example, attention and working memory
are closely associated with social and functional competence and
neurocognitive deﬁcits have also been detected prior to onset of illness
(Bowie et al., 2008; Carrión et al., 2011; Kurtz, 2011; Lin et al., 2011;
Lipkovich et al., 2009). Such deﬁcits may also inﬂuence how individuals
with schizophrenia can learn new skills as well as accurately detect and
respond to environmental demands (Corrigan and Green, 1993; Green,
1996).
In this context, Walker and Diforio (1997) suggest that trauma, stig-
ma, poverty, isolation, and attachment patterns play a signiﬁcant role in
the development of the neurocognitive abnormalities of schizophrenia.
They proposed “a neural diathesis-stress model” which integrates the
psychosocial and biological research on stress in schizophrenia. The
model is based on evidence that stress worsens symptoms and that
the diathesis is associated with a heightened response to stressors.
The authors indicate that one possible neural mechanism is the aug-
menting effect of the HPA axis on dopamine synthesis and receptors
that in turn may lead to abnormal dopamine receptor functioning. In
close relationshipwith the documented hippocampal damage in schizo-
phrenia these abnormalities could signiﬁcantly contribute to hypersen-
sitivity to stress in schizophrenic patients.
In relation to this work, Read et al. (2001) developed “a traumagenic
neurodevelopmental model”. The model is based on basic principles of
the diathesis-stress model of schizophrenia and proposes that a genetic
deﬁcit creates a predisposing vulnerability in the form of oversensitivity
to stress related to early aversive life events such as child abuse or pa-
rental neglect which, according to recent evidence may contribute to
the development of schizophrenia (Bob and Mashour, 2011; Fan et al.,
2008; Gil et al., 2009; Lysaker and LaRocco, 2009; Lysaker et al., 2007;
Roy, 2005; Sar et al., 2010; Scheller-Gilkey et al., 2004; Vogel et al.,
2009). For example, Lysaker and LaRocco (2008) studied the prevalence
of signiﬁcant traumas in schizophrenia patients and reported that two
thirds of these chronic schizophrenia patients exhibited clinically signif-
icant trauma symptoms including intrusive experiences, defensive
avoidance, dissociative experiences and other symptoms of mental dis-
integration. Also another recent study indicates that hallucinating
schizophrenia patients had higher percentages of dissociative experi-
ences in comparison to other schizophrenia patients (Perona-Garcelan
et al., 2008).Together these ﬁndings suggest that “mental disintegration” as a de-
creased ability to integrate cognitive and emotional information that
enables to form integrated self in the sense of Bleuler's concept of split-
ting may be an important aspect in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia.
Recent ﬁndings indicate that psychological splitting in schizophrenia
is likely speciﬁcally presented on a neural level as disrupted organiza-
tion in neural communication that may complementarily reﬂect inter-
related processes between mind and brain underlying disturbances of
mental integration that likely present a neural representation of the
splitting in schizophrenia (Bob andMashour, 2011). As recent data sug-
gest, splitting as a process of mental disintegration is also closely linked
to deﬁcits of themind's metacognitive abilities, whichmeans disturbed
ability to think about thinking and create connections between mental
events and integrate them into larger complex representations (Bob
and Mashour, 2011; Lysaker et al., 2013a).
As suggested by Moskowitz (2008), when Bleuler proposed distur-
bances of associations as the core feature of schizophrenia, he did not
refer merely to confusion due to the intrusion of unrelated ideas and
to the loss of fundamental ability of “associational synthesis” (p. 44)
which reduced the understanding of oneself as an embodied agent to
a set of fragmentswhichno longer served as a guide for goal directed ac-
tivity. Bleuler assumed that this lack of synthesis had an organic origin
but could also serve as a proximate cause of dysfunction. Bleuler pre-
sented detailed accounts of schizophrenia patients who are not able to
function socially or vocationally and due to the loss of the ability to syn-
thesize associations into larger images of oneself and others which then
results in metacognitive dysfunction.
4. Conscious awareness and metacognition
Conscious experience of the self and others requires reﬂection of
what is happening in the moment within one's own body and in the
world around which is called metacognition (Dimaggio and Lysaker,
2015). Metacognition as a psychological process represents a spectrum
of mental activities that involves thinking about thinking, ranging from
more discrete acts inwhich people recognize speciﬁc thoughts and feel-
ings to more synthetic acts in which context of intentions, thoughts,
feelings, and connections between events, are integrated into larger
complex representations (Dimaggio et al., 2009; Lysaker et al., 2013c;
Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2015).
Metacognition describes a range of mental activities ranging from
discrete to synthetic. (Pinkham et al., 2013; Lysaker et al., 2013c). Syn-
thetic forms of metacognition act in a different manner than do speciﬁc
beliefs or singular judgments that also affect life. Synthesized under-
standings lend meaning to events, and thus, supply reasons why to
carry out a certain act and to decide what is best done to resolve di-
lemmas given the unique psychology of oneself and the others in
one's life (Dimaggio et al., 2009; Lysaker et al., 2013c; Dimaggio and
Lysaker, 2015).
Metacognition is related to the construct ofmentalizing and both are
characterized by an ability to think about oneself and others, though the
latter considers disruptions of these processes happen in the context of
disturbed attachment (Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2015). Both discrete and
synthetic metacognitive activities allow persons to form evolving and
ﬂexible representations for themselves and others and thus are a cor-
nerstone of the ability to regulate affect and behavior (Dimaggio et al.,
2009; Lysaker et al., 2013c).
Deﬁcits have been found in abilities to detect very speciﬁcmental ac-
tivities such as behaviors, emotions and memories (Bacon et al., 2011;
Fourneret et al., 2002; van 't Wout et al., 2007). Looking at larger psy-
chological phenomena persons with schizophrenia experience trait
like deﬁcits in metacognition in both earlier and later forms of illness
(Lysaker et al., 2012; Vohs et al., 2014). They may, for instance, experi-
ence stable difﬁculties considering thoughts as subjective in nature, rec-
ognizing the complex internal states of others, understanding how
events can be seen fromdifferent perspectives, and usingmetacognitive
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metacognitive deﬁcits with negative symptoms (Hamm et al., 2012;
Lysaker et al., 2005; McLeod et al., 2014; Nicolò et al., 2012; Rabin et
al., 2014) as well as intrinsic motivation (Tas et al., 2012; Vohs and
Lysaker, 2014). Metacognition has also been linked with functional
competence (Lysaker et al., 2011c), subjective sense of recovery
(Kukla et al., 2013), stigma resistance (Nabors et al., 2014), therapeutic
alliance (Davis et al., 2011), vocational function (Lysaker et al., 2010a)
and interpersonal relationships (Lysaker et al., 2010b, 2011b).
5. Metacognition, brain connectivity and plasticity
In addition, current ﬁndings show thatmetacognition as an ability to
create a “cognitivewholeness” through various association pathways, as
already suggested by Bleuler, on neural level likely corresponds to the
ability of the brain to integrate information mainly linked to EEG syn-
chrony in gamma band and other frequencies of which neurobiological
substratum is unknown (Bob, 2011; Lee et al., 2003a; Peled, 1999;
Tononi and Edelman, 2000). From this point of view recent research
suggests that brain disintegration corresponds to psychological disinte-
gration (Crick, 1994; Baars, 2002; Bob, 2015). In this context, building
metacognitive abilities through speciﬁc forms of learning during psy-
chotherapy likely also inﬂuences the brain integrative processes.
These ﬁndings indicate that learning and memory processes including
a wide variety of environmental factors may inﬂuence development of
synaptic connections through new gene expression and that psycho-
therapy as a special learning process may speciﬁcally inﬂuence and
modify brain functions, metabolism in speciﬁc brain structures and
also genetic processes (Gabbard, 2000, 2007; Kandel, 1998, 1999).
In this sense, according to recent ﬁndings there is evidence that con-
sciousness may integrate brain functions (Baars, 2002; Kanwisher,
2001; Varela et al., 2001) and might be a gateway to brain integration
that enables access between otherwise separated neuronal functions
(Baars, 2002). In addition, current empirical data suggest that various
metacognitive practices related to meditation techniques with many
culturally different forms likely have very similar neurophysiological
correlates that could be related to increased brain synchrony and inte-
gration (Fell et al., 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010). Other recent data
also suggest that meditation, similarly like hypnosis functions through
attentional mechanisms that may inﬂuence brain processing of incom-
ing sensory stimuli and regulate underlying brain dynamics, such as
an interplay between cortical and subcortical structures andhemispher-
ic interactions (Bob, 2008; Crawford, 1994; Edmonston and Moscovitz,
1990; Rainville et al., 2002; Tang et al., 2007; Travis and Shear, 2010).
This inﬂuence of consciousness on brain integrationmay signiﬁcant-
ly change during various states of consciousness, in hypnosis (Baars,
2002), or during speciﬁc experiences such as psychotherapy or medita-
tion (Fell et al., 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010). In this context, recent
data indicate that meditation may signiﬁcantly increase conscious
awareness and focus attentional functions characterized by increased
beta and gamma activity, reﬂecting increased brain synchrony and inte-
gration (Fell et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2007; Travis and Shear, 2010), and
alsomay inﬂuence brain plasticity andmorphology as for example gray
matter or white matter density (Hölzel et al., 2011; Jang et al., 2011).
Typical and intriguing examples howmetacognitive abilities may inﬂu-
ence brain structures show data about “metacognitive” meditation
technique “mindfulness” (Chiesa and Serretti, 2010; Davidson et al.,
2003; Hölzel et al., 2007; Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011; Sheridan, 2003).
Using this meditation technique direct intriguing inﬂuences on cortical
thickness and other brain structural changes have been reported (Grant
et al., 2013; Hölzel et al., 2011; Lazar et al., 2005; Luders et al., 2012;
Tang et al., 2010, 2012; Fox et al., 2014). As recent meta-analysis indi-
cates (Fox et al., 2014) numerous studies have found that the gray and
white matter may be shaped by meditation. This research shows that
at least eight brain regions may be signiﬁcantly altered by meditation,
mainly regions of frontopolar cortex (Brodmann area 10) related tometa-awareness and also exteroceptive and interoceptive body aware-
ness related to sensory cortices and insula and may inﬂuence memory
consolidation and reconsolidation related hippocampal activities and
morphology. Other ﬁndings show that meditation may inﬂuence emo-
tional and self-regulatory processesmainly related to structures of ante-
rior and mid cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex, and also intra- and
interhemispheric communication via superior longitudinal fasciculus
and corpus callosum.
Taken together these data are in agreement with recent evidence in-
dicating that neural correlates of various mental states related to per-
ception, cognitive functions, and memory are based on various levels
of information connectivity and integration (Baars, 2002; Kanwisher,
2001; Varela et al., 2001). In this context, the inﬂuence of consciousness
on neural integration likely explains the brain changes during various
states of dissociated consciousness, in hypnosis (Baars, 2002; Bob,
2003; Li and Spiegel, 1992; Nelson and Bower, 1990; Rainville et al.,
2002), or during meditation (Fell et al., 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010).
These changesmay occur as a consequence of changes in attentional
functions that, according to several data in the case of meditation, are
characterized by increased beta and gamma activities reﬂecting in-
creased brain synchrony (Fell et al., 2010; Moss, 2002; Tang et al.,
2007; Travis and Shear, 2010; Travis et al., 2004; Stuckey et al., 2005).
Based on these ﬁndings metacognition, as a most prominent aspect of
meditation increasing self-reﬂective attentional functions, most likely
may be described as a highly integrated state of consciousness
(Jankowski and Holas, 2014) related to high neuronal connectivity
and integration (Fell et al., 2010; Travis and Shear, 2010). This increased
connectivity may appear on various levels of neural functions and al-
lows dynamically connected information processing that most likely
have a crucial role in integrative processes related to meditation and
psychotherapy.
6. Conclusion
In this close relationship between brain functions and metacogni-
tion, it is likely that it may have clinical implications that are important
to consider. If indeed brain neurocognitive functions through various
levels of neural binding interactwithmetacognition, then in therapeutic
interventions persons need to learn how to function in various
metacognitive frameworks. In this context, recent development of inte-
grative forms of psychotherapy shows novel perspectives how in prac-
tice of psychotherapy it is possible to help to form more complex and
integrated representations of the self and use this knowledge to re-
spond to psychological problems (Hasson-Ohayon, 2012; Lysaker et
al., 2011a, 2013b; Salvatore et al., 2012).
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